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Dispute Resolution Between Investors and
Broker-Dealers in the United States
Securities Markets
By CATHERINE McGumE,*
ROBERT LovE**
I. INTRODUCHON
During the twentieth century, a body of law has developed in the
United States which favors the use of means other than the courts for the
resolution of disputes. In particular, the use of arbitration as an alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution was strengthened with the adoption of
the first modem federal arbitration statute in 1925, the U.S. Arbitration
Act.' This statute was instrumental in promoting greater judicial accept-
ance of the ability of commercial parties to determine in advance by con-
tract how they would resolve any future disputes.
The U.S. Arbitration Act generally places contracts to arbitrate on
the same footing as other contracts. The statute provides that contracts
to arbitrate are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.2 The statute
further provides for the basic procedures for enforcement and vacation of
arbitration contracts and awards.' Recent U.S. case law has interpreted
the U.S. Arbitration Act as evincing a strong federal policy favoring arbi-
tration. These cases have rejected various challenges to the enforceabil-
0 Copyright 1990, McGuire & Love.
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1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
2. Id. § 2 (1988).
3. Id §§ 2, 3, 9, 10 (1988).
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ity of arbitration contracts, and more recently have rejected attempts by
state legislatures to impose special requirements on the use of arbitration
contracts.
Judicial acceptance of agreements to arbitrate future disputes did
not immediately follow the adoption of the U.S. Arbitration Act. Until
recently, the courts found that public policy dictated that disputes arising
under the federal securities laws and certain other statutes be resolved in
the courts. Current case law, however, has interpreted the federal arbi-
tration statute as mandating the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
At the same time, the securities markets in the United States have pro-
vided increasingly sophisticated arbitration forums for the resolution of
disputes between market professionals and their customers, and among
market professionals. Accordingly, the use of securities arbitration for
the resolution of securities-related disputes increased significantly during
the 1980s, particularly after 1987.
Cases submitted to arbitration increased more than sixfold, from
830 cases in 1980 to 5393 cases in 1989. 4 Beginning in 1986 the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's (SEC or Commission) oversight of the
arbitration forums administered by the securities industry's self-regula-
tory organizations (SROs)5 intensified.' Significant reforms to the rules
that govern the securities arbitration process and the use of predispute
contracts were developed through a dialogue between the Commission
and the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA)7 and were
approved by the Commission.'
4. These statistics have been compiled by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion (SICA), discussed below, whose individual members make statistical information available
upon request.
5. The securities industry's self-regulatory organizations include the National Associt-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and
the national securities exchanges.
6. The SEC commenced a comprehensive inspection of SRO arbitration programs fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), which
signalled increased use of SRO arbitration forums.
7. SICA operates as the forum for the evaluation and reform of SRO arbitration rules. It
was formed in 1977 to review then existing arbitration procedures. As discussed more fully in
Section II.D. of this paper, the securities industry formed the SICA at the Commission's invi-
tation as an alternative to the institution of the Commission's own proposals to establish a
system for the resolution of disputes between broker-dealers and their customers. A represen-
tative from each SRO, a representative of the securities industry, and four representatives of
the public serve on the SICA.
8. The arbitration rule changes of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the NASD were approved on May 10, 1989. Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Arbitration Process, Exchange Act Release No.
26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 (1989) [hereinafter May 1989 Order]. Arbitration rules of the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) were approved on August 2, 1989. Order Granting
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The reform process was initiated on September 10, 1987, through a
letter issued by the Commission 9 that set out its views on the need for
changes to SICA's Uniform Code of Arbitration (Uniform Code). The
changes have been adopted with few subsequent modifications by indi-
vidual SROs." The Commission's letter reflected the Commission's be-
lief in the need for thorough and active oversight of SRO arbitration
systems, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Shear-
son/American Express Ina v. McMahon, 12 which validated the enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration clauses in cases arising under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)."3 The Commission's
Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change Related to the Arbitration Process, Exchange
Act Release No. 27,093, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,731 (1989). The rules of the Midwest Stock Ex-
change were approved on August 25, 1989. Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Pro-
posed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration Process, Exchange Act Release No. 27,187, 54
Fed. Reg. 42,124 (1989), and the rules of the MSRB were approved on October 5, 1989. Order
Granting Partial Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Arbitration Process,
Exchange Act Release No. 27,341, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,103 (1990). The rules of the Pacific Stock
Exchange were approved on July 5, 1990. Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed
Rule Changes Relating to the Arbitration Process, Exchange Act Release No. 28,185, 55 Fed.
Reg. 28,704 (1990), and the rules of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange were approved on October
11, 1990. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration Process, Ex-
change Act Release No. 28,532, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,662 (1990).
9. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum to all SICA members (Sept. 10, 1987) (discussing
SRO arbitration) [hereinafter Sept. 10 Letter], reprinted in Arbitration Reform: Hearings on
HR. 4960 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (1988) [hereinafter Arbitration Reform].
10. The Uniform Code is maintained and periodically published by the individual mem-
bers of SICA. Updated copies are available most easily from the SRO members of SICA. The
most current published version of the code, now somewhat out of date, is contained in SECURi-
TIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, REPORT #6 (1989) [hereinafter UNIF.
CODE], which is also available from the SRO members of SICA. As discussed below, the
Uniform Code, in essence a model code, becomes effective only when incorporated within the
rules of the SROs.
1I. These SROs include the NASD, MSRB, and each of the national securities exchanges
that administers an arbitration system for dispute resolution between investors and broker-
dealers. Exchanges that sponsor arbitration programs are the American Stock Exchange, Inc.,
the Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., the Cincinnati
Stock Exchange, Inc., the Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc., the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
the Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc., and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.
12. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
13. Id. at 229. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 appears at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781
(1988).
In 1953, the Court in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), had determined that predispute
arbitration clauses in brokers' contracts with investors were unenforceable with respect to
claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933. The Court's decision in Wilko rested upon its
conclusion that the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act, section 14, precluded waiver of
that Act's grant of jurisdiction under section 22 to the state and federal courts for the resolu-
tion claims under the Act. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. The Court determined that the agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes was void since it was a "stipulation" within the meaning of
section 14 and the "right to select the judicial forum [was] the kind of 'provision' that [could]
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commitment to vigorous oversight of SRO arbitration was re-enforced by
the Court's decision in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Ex-
press Inc., 4 which overruled Wilko v. Swan, and permitted enforcement
of predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act)."5
The dialogue between the SICA and the Commission expanded in
July 1988 to include issues raised by the brokerage industry's use of
predispute arbitration clauses. The Commission recluested in a July 8,
1988, letter that the SROs review these issues. 6 Subsequent testimony
before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce in July 1988 specifically set
forth the direction to which the SROs needed to focus their attention. 17
The SROs responded to the Commission's overtures by developing,
through the SICA, a rule that requires specific written and highlighted
not be waived" in advance through a predispute contract. Id. Lower courts extended Wilko to
claims arising under the Exchange Act based upon the Exchange Act's substantially identical
antiwaiver provision. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797
F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 922 (1987); Conover v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987). These eases were
vacated by the Supreme Court following the decision in Shearson/American Express.
14. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
15. Id. The Securities Act of 1933 appears at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). A series of
five recent Supreme Court decisions, not discussed herein, have combined with McMahon and
Rodriguez to establish a strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the enforcement of par-
ties' agreements to arbitrate their disputes. These cases are: Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987); Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
In addition, courts have rejected various attempts by the state legislatures to impose spe-
cial requirements on the use of arbitration agreements because those state actions were pre-
empted by the U.S. Arbitration Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114
(1st Cir. 1989) (Commonwealth of Massachusetts had adopted a regulation limiting the use of
arbitration clauses in contracts between brokers and investors in that state); Saturn Distrib.
Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990) (Commonwealth of Virginia had adopted a
provision that limited arbitration clauses in contracts between autorobile manufacturers and
automobile dealers). In addition, the Securities Industry Association and several broker deal-
ers filed suit on August 17, 1990, against the State of Florida in connection with a provision
that established requirements for arbitration provisions in contracts between broker-dealers
and investors in that state. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Gerald Lewis, No. 90-1934 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 29, 1990). The District Court issued an order on October 19, 1990, stating that it would
issue an opinion and order during the week of October 29, 1990, granting plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, invalidating the Florida provision. Id.
16. Letter from David S. Ruder to John J. Phelan, Jr. (July 8, 1988), reprinted in Arbitra-
tion Reform, supra note 9, at 509 [hereinafter July 8 Letter].
17. See Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at 476 (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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disclosures in connection with the use of predispute arbitration clauses., '
The rule also prohibits SRO members from having agreements with cus-
tomers that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO, limit the ability of a
party to file any claim in arbitration, or limit the ability of the arbitrators
to make any award.' 9
The Commission approved the resulting rules submitted by the
SROs in its May 1989 Order.2" The Commission also made clear in the
September 1987 letter that Commission oversight of SRO arbitration
rules is active and ongoing and that "further changes may be necessary
as the SRO arbitration systems adapt to handle more complex cases and
as the Commission continues its review of SRO arbitration programs."2
Its oversight program is designed to monitor the effectiveness of both the
newly approved enhancements to the SRO arbitration rules and the new
requirements pertaining to the use of arbitration clauses. Further, SEC
staff remains active in the SICA's and the individual SRO's continuing
agenda to improve the administration of the arbitration process.
II. BACKGROUND-OVERSIGHT OF THE SRO
ARBITRATION PROGRAMS
The Commission's support for arbitration as a means for the resolu-
tion of disputes between broker-dealers and customers has been coupled
with the exercise of the Commission's broad oversight authority over the
SROs' arbitration programs.'
A. Commission Review of SRO Arbitration Rules
The SEC exercises its oversight authority through the review of
SRO rules. Under section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, each SRO must
file with the SEC proposed changes to its rules, including rules and pro-
cedures governing the conduct of its arbitration programs.' The Com-
18. UNIF. CODE § 31 (SICA 1989).
19. Id.
20. May 1989 Order, supra note 8, at 21,155. The rules of the NASD, NYSE, and
AMEX were approved in the May 1989 order. See supra note 8 for approval dates of compa-
rable rules of other SROs.
21. Sept. 10 Letter, supra note 9, at 1-2, reprinted in Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at
496-97.
22. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6, 15A, 15B, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78,
78o to 78o-4, 78s (1988). The Supreme Court has recognized the Commission's "expansive
power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the SROs" and the
Commission's "power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that
arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987).
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1988). Accordingly, the
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mission publishes notice of proposed SRO rule changes and provides
interested persons an opportunity to comment on them. Subject only to
certain limited exceptions, proposed rule changes do not take effect until
they are approved by the Commission. Under section 19(b), the Com-
mission approves proposed rule changes if it finds that they are consistent
with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
applicable to SROs.24
B. Authority to Amend SRO Arbitration Rules
In addition to its authority to approve or reject SRO rule proposals,
the Commission has the authority to amend SRO rules on its own mo-
tion. Under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may
change SRO rules as it deems necessary or appropriate to promote the
fair administration of the SRO, to conform its rules to the requirements
of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations applicable to the SRO,
or otherwise to further the purposes of the Act.25
C. Inspection of Arbitration Programs
The Commission also fulfills its oversight responsibilities over secur-
ities arbitration by exercising its inspection authority over the SROs.
Under the Exchange Act, the exchanges and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) are required to be organized and have the
capacity to carry out the purposes of the Exchange Act's rules and regu-
lations as well as their own rules.26
Uniform Code (including any of the periodic amendments to the Code) as adopted by SICA
had no legal significance until incorporated into the rules of its SRO members, Once SICA
adopted the Code, the boards of the various SROs voted to adopt SRO rules which were filed
with and approved by the Commission.
24. Among the requirements of the Exchange Act are that the rules of an SRO act to
"prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices, promote just and equitable principles of trade
... and, in general, protect investors and the public interest" (applicable to all SROs adminis-
tering arbitration programs). 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1988).
The rules must also "provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and
other charges among its members and issuers and other persons using" its facilities (applicable
to exchanges and the NASD). Id § 78o-3(b)(5) (1988). Commission Rule 19b-4, 17 CF.R.
pt. 240.19b-4 (1990), governs the review of SRO rule proposals (Rule 19b-4 review).
25. In exercising its authority under the Act to amend SRO rules, the Commission is
required to:
notify the [SRO] and publish notice of the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Regis.
ter. The notice shall include the text of the proposed amendment to the rules of the
[SRO] and the Commission's reasons... for commencing such proposed rulemaking.
The Commission shall give interested persons an opportunity for the oral presenta.
tion of data, views, and arguments ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(l)-(2) (1988).
26. See id. §§ 6(b)(1), 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (1988). In addition,
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In order to determine whether the SROs are properly enforcing
compliance with their own rules as well as the requirements of the Ex-
change Act, the Commission has the authority to inspect all SRO
records.2 7 As part of its regular oversight program, the SEC conducts
inspections of the regulatory and other programs administered by the
SROs, including arbitration facilities. In the 1980s the Commission com-
pleted one arbitration inspection, which was a comprehensive review of
securities industry sponsored arbitration.2"
D. Early Commission Oversight Activities
Current SRO arbitration programs evolved out of initiatives result-
ing from the Commission's oversight activities. The first major effort at
focusing public and industry attention on the availability of low cost and
fair dispute resolution forums for investors came in the mid-1970s. In
November 1976 the Commission proposed the development of a compre-
hensive system of dispute resolution procedures for small claims. 29 How-
ever, at the suggestion of the Securities Industry Association and the
SROs, the Commission decided to defer direct action on the system
pending the development and implementation by the SROs of an investor
dispute resolution system, including a uniform arbitration code.3° In or-
der to accomplish these goals, SICA, composed of representatives of
SROs, SRO members, and the public, was organized in April 1977.
SICA drafted the Uniform Code of Arbitration, which has been adopted
by all ten of its SRO members.31
The scope of the Uniform Code was expanded from its original fo-
cus on small claims to provide a uniform set of rules for the arbitration of
all investor/broker-dealer disputes. The Uniform Code is also used by
some SROs for the resolution of intra-industry disputes, such as disputes
between members of an SRO or between a member of an SRO and a
section 19(g) of the Exchange Act provides that every SRO shall comply with the provisions of
the Exchange Act and rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules, and shall, unless
relieved of responsibility by the SEC, or absent reasonable jUstiication or excuse, enforce com-
pliance with such provisions by its members and persons associated with its members. fd
§ 19(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (1988). For the NASD this includes the rules of the MSRB. See id
27. Id § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1988).
28. See 53 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1987).
29. See Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,528, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,808 (1976); An Integrated Nationwide Sys-
tem for the Resolution of Investor Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 12,974, 41 Fed. Reg.
50,880 (1976).
30. Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution System, Exchange Act Release
No. 13,470, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,892 (1977).
31. See May 1989 Order, supra note 8, at 21,145 n.7.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
person associated with a member, such as a registered representative.3 2
In the years since the initial development of the Uniform Code, SICA
met periodically to discuss issues that arose in the administration of the
code, and to develop any necessary amendments. SICA has met fre-
quently since September 1987 to address the issues raised by the Com-
mission in its September 1987 and July 1988 letters, as well as other
problems.
E. Current Oversight of the Arbitration Programs
Commission oversight of SRO arbitration programs during the late
1980s has taken shape through several specific actions. During 1986 and
1987, the Commission staff conducted a review of SRO-sponsored arbi-
tration. The focus of the review was broad, and was designed to test both
the fairness and efficiency of SRO arbitration programs. The Commis-
sion authorized the staff to send a letter to all SICA members indicating
the results of the staff's review. The letter also made recommendations
for improvement. On September 10, 1987, the Division of Market Regu-
lation transmitted a letter to each member of SICA. The letter noted
that "[t]he Commission believes that securities industry arbitration gen-
erally operates fairly,"33 but also stated that "there are numerous ways in
which the process can be improved."34 The letter stated that:
Securities industry arbitration has changed a great deal since the Uni-
form Code of Arbitration ("Uniform Code") was adopted by the Se-
curities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"). Those changes
broadened investor, particularly small investor, access to justice. At
that time, arbitration forums were conceived by the Commission and
the SROs as providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to
the courts for investors. Now, recent cases upholding predispute arbi-
tration agreements together with increasing post-dispute selection of
SRO-sponsored arbitration suggest that SRO-sponsored arbitration
may become the primary forum for the resolution of disputes between
broker-dealers and investors. This reduces the degree of informality
properly available to the systems. At the same time, the Commission
believes that the fundamental speed and efficiency of the arbitration
system should be maintained.35
The letter set out a number of detailed recommendations for im-
provement of the industry-sponsored arbitration system. The recom-
32. Id at 21,145 n.6.
33. Sept. 10 Letter, supra note 9, at 1, reprinted in Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at
496.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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mendations included: (1) revising standards for eligibility to serve as a
public arbitrator; (2) disclosure to the parties of arbitrator background
and affiliations; (3) instituting procedures to provide for public disclosure
of the results of arbitration cases; (4) codifying and expanding discovery
procedures; and (5) instituting programs for arbitrator training and
evaluation.
Those recommendations contained in the September 1987 letter that
were amenable to action through SRO rules have been acted on by SICA
and approved in the Commission's May 1989 Order.36 Continuing SEC
review includes evaluation of the administration of the various arbitra-
tion programs, analysis of case files, and interviews with program admin-
istrators, staff, and persous participating in the arbitration process.
Review by the Commission is designed to promote the proper function-
ing of SRO arbitration programs consistent with the promotion of just
and equitable principles of trade, and to protect investors.37 Moreover,
further staff review, as well as possible suggestions by SICA, the SROs,
or members of the securities bar,31 could result in recommendations for
further changes in the arbitration rules or programs.
In addition, oversight is carried out through continuing informal
staff contact with SRO arbitration programs. Over the years since the
adoption of the Code, the Commission's staff has generally maintained
close contact with SICA and the various Directors of Arbitration at the
SROs concerning specific issues that arise with respect to the administra-
tion of the Code. For example, the Commission encourages SROs to
maintain adequate resources to handle the growing number of cases and
maintain or reduce the backlogs to acceptable levels.39
36. For a discussion of these recommendations, see infra text accompanying notes 58-97.
37. The Commission also may take remedial action against any SRO that has violated the
Exchange Act, the rules thereunder, or its own rules. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1988). Failures by the SROs to fairly implement their arbitration
rules could subject them to Commission action. The Commission or its staff cannot, however,
intervene in any specific arbitration, either to amend the course of the proceedings or to vacate
an award. The narrow grounds for vacating an award in court are set out in the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
38. Various sections of the American Bar Association periodically form subcommittees to
consider securities arbitration issues.
39. Rapidly growing use is being made of the SRO arbitration facilities. The total number
of cases filed in SRO arbitration has risen steadily. There were 830 cases in SRO arbitration in
1980, 2796 in 1985, and 5393 in 1989 (down from 6101 in 1988). In 1989, 3651 cases were
filed with the NASD, the largest arbitration forum. This represents a 26% increase over the
2886 cases filed with the NASD in 1987 and a 130% increase over the 1587 cases filed in 1986.
The NYSE received 1407 cases in 1989, a 34% increase over its 1987 caseload of 1050 cases.
The NASD's filings were down 8% in 1989 from 1988 and the NYSE's filings were down 13%
in 1989 from 1988. This downward trend does not appear, based on informal SRO data, to be
continuing. Growth in the docket places strains on the SRO arbitration departments. Case
1991]
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I. RELATIONSHIP OF SRO ARBITRATION
PROGRAMS AND SRO DISCIPLINARY
DEPARTMENTS
A. Public Responsibilities of SROs
Provision of arbitration facilities is only one example of the public
responsibilities carried out by the SROs. For example, the SROs are also
charged with maintaining fair and orderly markets, 40 and with disciplin-
ing their members for violations of the securities laws and the SROs'
rules.41 The arbitration facilities are administered, however, quite differ-
ently from the other SRO functions.
B. Difference Between the Arbitration and Disciplinary Functions
SRO disciplinary actions are prosecuted by SRO personnel and de-
cided by SRO personnel, committees of SRO members, or both. Disci-
plinary actions are also subject to review both within the SRO and by the
Commission.42 The arbitration cases are not decided by SRO personnel
or committees. Instead, the SRO merely provides the forum; it provides
the rules under which the cases are administered, physically handles the
paperwork and provides a room in which the parties will meet, and
designates the arbitrators.43 The SRO may not influence the decisions in
particular cases. Moreover, decisions by the arbitrato:rs are not appeala-
ble to any superior body within the SRO, nor to the Commission. Any
attempt to appeal a decision must be taken in accordance with the appli-
cable arbitration law.
C. Links Between the Arbitration and Disciplinary Functions
There are, however, certain links between SROs' enforcement, regu-
turnaround at the NASD was 11.5 months in 1989 (down from 12.1 in 1988) and at the NYSE
was 9.4 months in 1989 (up from 8.2 in 1988).
40. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6, I1A(2), 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f,
78k(2), 780-3(b)(6) (1988).
41. See, e.g., id. §§ 6(b)(1), 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (1988).
42. See, e.g., id. § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (1988); Rules of Fair Practice: Article V,
Section 1, Nat'l Ass'n See. Dealers (CCH) 1 2301; Bylaws: Article XII, Section 1, Article
XIII, Section 1, Article XIV, Section 1, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 1251, 1261, 1271;
Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article II, Section 1, Article III, Section 1, Nat'l Ass'n See.
Dealers (CCH) 1 3021, 3034 (May 10, 1989).
43. Under the Uniform Code, SRO staff also had a number of other responsibilities. For
example, the SROs' staff and governing committees have the ability to determine whether a
particular case is a proper subject matter for arbitration, and may decline the use of their
facilities, thus sending parties to litigate their disputes through the courts. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 100-108; Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article [II, Section 12(b), Nat'l
Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 3712 (May 10, 1989).
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latory, and arbitration programs. In cases where misconduct alleged
against a firm or employee of a firm is particularly egregious, arbitrators
may refer the matter to the disciplinary arm of the SRO. Of course the
referral is precatory, rather than binding, and an SRO may decide
whether to pursue a matter. Nevertheless, a referral from a panel of arbi-
trators that has had the opportunity to hear testimony and examine doc-
umentary evidence may be influential with disciplinary committees.4 By
the same token, parties are both free and encouraged to take their allega-
tions of wrongdoing directly to the regulatory authorities (both the SROs
and the Commission), which may take disciplinary action regardless of
whether the arbitrators had decided in favor of the complaining party.
Thus, arbitrators may conclude that there is no award due to a customer
while enforcement authorities may find that the law has been violated,
and that disciplinary action, which could result in limiting the future
securities activities of firms or their employees, or in fines and other sanc-
tions, is appropriate.
There are several other possible disciplinary consequences to broker-
dealers and their personnel related to the arbitration process. Since
SROs are charged with enforcing compliance with the law by their mem-
bers, they review customer complaints and the results of significant liti-
gated and arbitrated actions against their members.45 Particularly now
that arbitration results are more conveniently maintained and publicized,
SROs will be reviewing cases for possible regulatory or enforcement
action.46
The SROs' disciplinary authority also encourages members and
their associated persons to participate in arbitrations in good faith. SRO
rules require brokers to submit to arbitrations initiated by customers and
any SRO of which the broker is a member.47 The rules also require
44. The regulatory authorities, of course, remain obligated to prove independently any
alleged violations by broker-dealers or their associated persons.
45. See, eg., Rule 351, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2351 (May 10, 1989) (requiring firms
to file Form RE-3 when cases are settled or certain other events of regulatory concern occur);
Bylaws, Schedule C, Article IV, Nat'1 Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 1786 (May 10, 1989) (re-
quiring the reporting of disciplinary events). Associated persons are also obligated to amend
Form U-4 to disclose significant settled cases.
46. Of course, not all private disputes between brokers and their customers warrant regu-
latory attention, even where it is determined that the broker owes money or some specific
performance in favor of the customer. A determination that a customer is owed money is not
equivalent to a determination that there has been a violation of law or that just and equitable
principles of trade have been breached sufficiently to warrant regulatory action.
47. See Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Section 12(a), Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Deal-
ers (CCH) 1 3712 (May 10, 1989); Constitution, Article VIII, Sections 1-2, 2 Am. Stock Ex.
Guide (CCH) 9062, 9063 (May 10, 1989); Rule 18.3(a), Chicago Bd. Options Ex. Guide
(CCH) 2513 (Dec. 1989); Chapter XXXII, Section l(b), Boston Stock Ex. Guide (CCH)
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members and associated persons of members to comply with orders to
produce documents and to honor awards rendered by arbitrators. Bro-
kers who fail to honor awards or other orders risk disciplinary action.48
Finally, while neither the SROs nor the Commission may overturn
an arbitration award or remove an arbitrator once the arbitrator has been
sworn to a case, SRO arbitration directors are expected to assure that
particular arbitrators who have not followed the arbitration rules, or
failed to comply with the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators will not serve as
SRO arbitrators in the future. The Commission stressed in its September
1987 letter, and the staff has stressed in recent meetings with SICA, that
a strong evaluation system must be in place to assure the quality of arbi-
trators used in SRO arbitration.49
IV. ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
A. Appointment of Arbitrators
Once appointed, arbitrators have complete control of the procedural
and substantive decisions affecting the case. The arbitrators are in-
dependent of the SROs that appoint them. Although arbitration panels
2601 (June, 1989); Rule 24, Section l(a), Midwest Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 11554 (Oct., 1989);
Rule 12.1(b), Pac. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 6435 (Aug. 1990); Rule G-35, Section 2(b), Mun.
Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Manual (CCH) % 3671 (Dec. 1, 1989); see also Roney & Co. v. Goren,
875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1985) (confirming the ability of customers to choose to arbitrate at any
of the arbitration forums administered by SROs of which their firm is a member).
In addition, the SROs similarly require persons who wish to become associated persons of
a member firm to agree to comply with the SROs' rules by signing and submitting a Uniform
Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (Form U.4). The U-4 constitutes
a specific agreement to arbitrate disputes between the employee and a customer in accordance
with .the rules of the SRO with which the person registers.
48. The resolution of the NASD Board of Goveruors provides as follows:
It may [be] deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade
and a violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice for a member or
a person associated with a member to fall to submit a dispute for arbitration under
the Code of Arbitration Procedure as required by that Code, or to fail to appear or to
produce any document in his possession or control as directed pursuant to provisions
of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, or to fall to honor an award of arbitrators
properly rendered pursuant to the Code of Arbitration Procedure where a timely
motion has not been made to vacate or modify such award pur;uant to applicable
law.
All awards shall be honored by a cash payment to the prevailing party of the
exact dollar amount stated in the award. Awards may not be honored by crediting
the prevailing party's account with the dollar amount of the award, unless authorized
by the express terms of the award or consented to in writing by the parties. Awards
shall be honored upon receipt thereof, or within such other time period as may be
prescribed by the award.
Code of Arbitration Procedure, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 3744 (May 10, 1989).
49. For a discussion on arbitrator evaluation, see infra section VI.B of this article.
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are initially appointed by the arbitration department staff;" the staff has
no authority over the arbitrators' handling of a case. Most arbitration
panels in cases involving public customers are made up of three per-
sons,51 all of whom are required to be neutral. 52  In particular cases,
SROs may attempt to select panelists that have some expertise directly
related to the matter in controversy. Diligent parties, moreover, may
have a significant impact upon the composition of their arbitration
panels.
Even before a panel is selected, parties are free to advise the SRO of
their views concerning panel composition, although the SROs are not
bound to act on those views. For example, it is not inappropriate for a
party to suggest that the panel include an accountant, attorney, or other
professional with specific knowledge in an area of dispute.
B. Questions About, and Challenges to Arbitrators
Once parties are notified of a prospective panel, the parties are enti-
tled to receive both the employment history and other disclosures about
the arbitrator. The arbitrator must provide this information pursuant to
the SRO rules.53 Parties should use this information to determine
whether to exercise their cause or peremptory challenges. Likewise, par-
50. See, eg., Rules 601(f), 607, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) f1 2601, 2607 (May 10, 1989);
Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article I, Section 4, Article III, Sections 13(f), 19(a)-(b),
Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 3704, 3713, 3719 (May 10, 1989).
51. For cases involving a dollar amount not exceeding S10,000, claims are submitted to a
single arbitrator who ordinarily resolves the cases pursuant to simplified procedures, without
an oral hearing. See Rule 601, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2601 (May 10, 1989); Code of
Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Sections 13(f), 19(a) Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) F1
3713, 3719 (May 10, 1989). Further, at the NASD, cases involving claims of more than
S10,000 and not more than S30,000 may be resolved by a single arbitrator, unless either party
requests a panel of three arbitrators. Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article I1, Section 19(a),
Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 3719 (May 10, 1989). Finally, the arbitration rules permit
the directors of arbitration sufficient flexibility to appoint panels of five persons for those situa-
tions where there is a need for broader expertise on a particular panel. See, eg., Rule 607, 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2607 (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article III,
Section 19(b), Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 3719 (May 10, 1989).
52. Panel chairpersons have responsibility for managing the conduct of the proceedings,
but have only a single vote, and other panel members are entitled to pursue matters as they
deem appropriate. Under the new discovery rules, public arbitrators are generally chosen to
resolve prehearing disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 75-84 for further discussion.
The arbitrator involved in prehearing matters often may be named chairperson of the panel.
53. The rule requires that arbitrators disclose any existing or past financial, business, pro-
fessional, family, or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or might reason-
ably create an appearance of partiality or bias. See, eg., Rule 610,2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2610 (May 10, 1989); Rule 603, 2 Am. Stock E. Guide (CCH) 1 9542 (May 10, 1989); Code of
Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Section 23, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) r 3723 (May
10, 1989); infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
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ties should ask appropriate follow-up questions that have a bearing on a
prospective arbitrator's expertise or impartiality. Parties may also review
any awards rendered by a prospective arbitrator since May 19, 1989,
which may be probative in evaluating how the arbitrator ruled in cases
involving similar types of claims. 4 This may be a party's only effective
opportunity to pursue these issues, for once an arbitrator has been sworn,
neither, the SEC nor the SRO can remove him from a case. Only the
arbitrator may remove himself from a panel, and his duty to ascertain
and disclose potential conflict continues during his appointment.15
C. Ethical Standards and Arbitrator Immunity
It is especially important for arbitrators to maintain the highest pos-
sible ethical standards,56 and for SRO arbitration administrators to main-
tain effective evaluation systems because of the immunity of arbitrators
from civil liability for any breach of their duties. Arbitrator immunity is
an extension of the tradition of immunity of the judiciary, and recognizes
that arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity. Similarly, agencies such
as the SROs that administer arbitrations have been held to enjoy immu-
nity from civil action. The Second Circuit recently ruled that the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange cannot be sued for damages stemming
from alleged improprieties in an arbitration it administered.
5 7
V. THE NEW ARBITRATION RULES
SICA has met regularly since September 1987 to develop amend-
ments to the Uniform Code of Arbitration that address the concerns set
out in the Commission's September 1987 letter. These rules have been
54. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74 for a discussion of the public availability of
arbitration results.
55. The AAA is a private, not-for-profit organization that administers arbitration pro-
ceedings and other forms of private dispute resolution processes. In contrast, the American
Arbitration Association's rules provide that the AAA administrator may remove an arbitrator
who becomes disqualified to perform his duties. See AAA SEcs. ARis. RULES § 19; M. WIL-
NER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 22:02 (rev. ed. 1990).
56. All SRO arbitrators are provided with a copy of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics for
Commercial Arbitrators.
57. S. Ezra Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc., 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990)
("'[e]xtension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards [that] sponsor arbitration is a natural
and necessary product of the policies underlying arbitral immunity; otherwise the immunity
extended to arbitrators is illus[ory]. It would be of little value to the wvhole arbitral procedure
to merely shift the liability to the sponsoring association.' " (quoting Corey v. New York Stock
Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982)). The AAA has also been found to be not
subject to suit for damages in connection with cases it has administered. See Rubenstein v.
Otterbourg, 78 Misc. 2d 376, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973), discussed in M. WILNER, supra note 55,
at § 23:02.
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adopted by individual SROs and approved by the Commission.5"
A. Rules Regarding Classification of Arbitrators
The Commission recommended that securities industry retirees, se-
curities industry lawyers, and spouses of securities industry employees all
be excluded from the public arbitrator roster within three years from the
Commission's September 1987 letter. The Uniform Code has been
amended to define who may serve as public and industry arbitrators con-
sistent with the recommendations made in the Commission's letter. Not
all of the SROs have adopted the standards for arbitrators provided in
the Uniform Code, but instead have adopted alternative approaches to
meeting the Commission's concerns.59
1. Uniform Code. The Uniform Code excludes from the pool of
public arbitrators persons who are associated with a broker, dealer, gov-
ernment securities dealer, municipal securities dealer, or an investment
adviser."o It also excludes persons who have been associated with any
such entity within the past three years or who are retired from any such
entity.6" The Uniform Code also excludes attorneys and other profes-
sionals who have devoted twenty percent or more of their work effort to
securities industry clients over a two-year period preceding an arbitration
for which they are asked to serve.62 Spouses and other close relations of
securities industry personnel are also excluded from the public arbitrator
roster (and may serve as industry arbitrators only if they qualify indepen-
58. A full discussion of the changes to the SROs' arbitration rules is found in the Com-
mission's May 1989 Order approving the NYSE, NASD, and AMEX rules. See May 1989
Order, supra note 8.
59. Arbitration panels at the SROs for cases involving public customers have historically
been composed of a majority of public arbitrators and a minority of industry arbitrators, unless
the investor requests a panel composed solely of industry panelists. Small claims are resolved
by a single public arbitrator. The AAA amended its securities arbitration rules in 1987 to
provide for mixed public/industry panels, although it has published no guidelines for who may
serve as a public arbitrator. AAA SEcs. ARB. RULEs Rule 17.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (1988) defines a "person associated with a broker or dealer,"
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(32) (1988) defines a "person associated with a municipal securities dealer,"
and 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(45) (1990) defines a "person associated with a government securities
dealer." The term "person associated with an investment adviser" is defined in section
202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(aXl7) (1988). The
terms refer generally to all persons who control, are controlled by, or are employees of these
entities, other than those whose functions are clerical or ministerial.
61. UNIF. CODE § 8 (SICA 1989). This distinction would permit, accordingly, persons
who have moved on to other professions to serve as public arbitrators after three years, while
excluding persons who have retired from the securities industry and have not established
themselves in a new profession.
62. Id
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dently as industry arbitrators).63
2. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 607. The NYSE rule
tracks the Uniform Code with two modifications. First, the NYSE has
extended the time period for former securities industry personnel to be
excluded from the public arbitrator pool from three years to five years.64
Second, the NYSE proposal excludes a somewhat larger group of former
industry personnel notwithstanding the passage of time: persons who
have spent a substantial part of their business careers in the securities
industry are excluded from the pool.6" The NYSE also prepared written
guidelines setting out its policies in applying the rule on arbitrator
classification.66
3. NASD Section 19. The NASD rule permits persons associated
with investment advisers to serve as public arbitrators.67 The rule is
otherwise the same as the Uniform Code.
4. Other SROs. The other SROs' rules or filings are consistent
with the NYSE and NASD models.
B. Rules Governing Disclosure of Arbitration Results
The Commission requested that the SRO arbitration forums make
publicly available summary data on the results of arbitrations. The Uni-
form Code has been amended to provide standards for the contents and
public dissemination of arbitral awards. There are a few differences
among the SROs' award rules.
1. .Uniform Code. The Uniform Code provides for all arbitrators'
awards to contain the following: the names of the parties; a summary of
the issues in controversy; the damages and relief requested and awarded;
a statement of any other issues resolved, such as the fact that a claim was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction over a particular party; the date the
claim was filed and the date the award was rendered; the number and
dates of hearing sessions; the location of the hearing(s); the names of the
arbitrators; and the signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the
award.68 The Uniform Code also provides for the awards to be made
public according to the policies of the individual SROs.69
2. NYSE Rule 627. The NYSE's rule 627 provides that the
63. Id.
64. Rule 607, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) T 2607 (May 10, 1989).
65. Id.
66. These guidelines are printed together with all copies of the NYSE's arbitration rules.
67. Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Section 19, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers
(CCH) % 3719 (May 10, 1989).
68. UNIF. CODE § 28 (SICA 1989).
69. Id. In contrast, awards at the AAA are required to state the resolution of any statu-
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awards will be made public, with the proviso that a nonindustry party
may request that his name not be included on the public version of the
award.7
0
3. NASD Section 41. The NASD's rule provides that the awards
will be made public, except for the names of the arbitrators.71 Awards
including the names of arbitrators will be made available, however, to
parties in specific cases who are determining whether to accept a particu-
lar arbitrator for the panel in their own case.72
4. Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) Section 31.
The MSRB's rule provides that the public customers' names will not be
available to the public unless the public customers specifically consent.73
In addition, the MSRB's rule provides awards with arbitrators' names
only to parties in specific cases who are determining whether to accept a
particular arbitrator for the panel in their own case.'
The Bureau of National Affairs' Securities Regulation and Law Re-
port, the Securities Arbitration Commentator, and other publications peri-
odically publish some SRO arbitration awards. Awards may also be
obtained directly from the SROs.
C. Discovery Rules
The Commission requested that the Uniform Code be amended as
follows: (1) to ensure fair and timely document production between the
parties before the arbitration hearing; (2) to allow for prehearing confer-
ences and preliminary hearings for large or complex cases; and (3) to
provide for the deposition of persons who are unable or are unwilling to
appear as witnesses in the proceedings. The Uniform Code has been
amended to improve the prehearing resolution of information requests.
1. Uniform Code. The Uniform Code provides timetables for par-
ties either to produce requested information, or to object to the produc-
tion requests.75  The Code also establishes a mechanism to hold
prehearing conferences either in person or by telephone conference call,
and to take discovery disputes before a single arbitrator prior to the first
tory claims. The AAA does not make any of its awards publicly available. AAA SEcs. Axa.
RULES Rule 42.
70. Rule 627, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2627 (May 10, 1989).
71. Code of Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Section 41(f), Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers
(CCH) 3741 (May 10, 1989).
72. Id
73. Rule G-35, Section 31, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Manual (CCH) r 3671 (Dec. I,
1989).
74. I
75. UNIF. CODE § 20 (SICA 1989).
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hearing.76 The single arbitrator would have the authority to issue sub-
poenas, direct appearances of witnesses and production of documents, set
deadlines for compliance, and issue other rulings that would expedite the
arbitration proceedings or enable a party to fully develop its case, includ-
ing the ordering of depositions in appropriate cases. During the rule 19b-
4 review,77 the NASD and the American Stock Exchange (Amex)
amended their filings to provide that the single arbitrator appointed to
decide prehearing matters would be a public arbitrator in those cases
where public customers have requested a majority of public arbitrators
for their panel. The NYSE subsequently made this amendment to its
rules.78
2. NYSE Rule 619. The NYSE's rule conforms to the Uniform
Code. In addition, the NYSE also incorporated its provisions dealing
with subpoenas and the power of arbitrators to direct appearances and
production of documents into its prehearing rules, unlike the Uniform
Code, which includes these provisions in separate rules.7 9 There is no
substantive difference between the rules.
3. NASD Section 32. The NASD's rule contains one difference
concerning the ability of a single arbitrator to issue orders before a hear-
ing. The NASD rule permits an arbitrator to issue such a ruling "which
will expedite the arbitration proceeding," but has not yet been amended
to include the language "or is necessary to permit any party to develop
fully its case." There should be no negative inference from this
difference. 80
4. MSRB Section 22. The MSRB's rule contains two differences
from the Uniform Code. Under the MSRB rule, prehearing conferences
may be less routine as they require the concurrence either of the director
of arbitration or of the arbitrators.81 Also, the full arbitration panel,
rather than the director of arbitration, would determine whether to select
76. Id. Prehearing conferences may be presided over by SRO staff. The staff has no au-
thority to order parties to produce documents, but may encourage parties to stipulate to facts,
exchange documents and other information prior to hearing, and to resolve other prehearing
matters. If this process cannot resolve prehearing issues, a single arbitrator would be
appointed.
77. See supra note 24.
78. Rule 619, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2619 (May 10, 1989). The AAA has no specific
procedure comparable to the new SRO rule establishing clear timetables for document ex-
changes, although its rules do provide for prehearing conferences that may resolve such dis-
putes. The AAA rules also make no specific provision for the taking of depositions.
79. Id.
80. See May 1989 Order, supra note 8, at 21,150 n.36.
81. Rule G-35, Section 22(d), Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Manual (CCH) q 3671 (Dec. 1,
1989).
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a single arbitrator to resolve prehearing matters or whether the full panel
would itself resolve these matters.8 2 The MSRB rule also requires that
the prehearing matters be resolved (either by the full panel or a single
arbitrator) at least ten days prior to the hearing on the merits.83
5. Other SROs. The other SROs' rules or proposals conform to the
Uniform Code.
In addition to the prehearing procedures established in the new
rules, parties should be aware that under state law they may have re-
course in the courts for provisional remedies, such as temporary re-
straining orders or injunctions. In order to facilitate such recourse
without waiving one's contractual right to arbitrate, the American Arbi-
tration Association's (AAA) rule 47(a) provides that: "No judicial pro-
ceedings by a party relating to the subject matter of the arbitration shall
be deemed a waiver of the party's right to arbitrate."
' ' 4
D. Rules Governing Arbitrator Disclosure
The Commission requested that the arbitrator disclosure provisions
of the Uniform Code be amended to include specifically the minimum
scope of potential types of relationships that a prospective arbitrator
must consider and disclose, and to provide for the notification to the par-
ties of all arbitrator disclosures. Such disclosure would cover both pro-
fessional and personal relationships with the securities industry as well as
with the parties and their counsel. The Uniform Code has been amended
to provide for extensive and ongoing disclosure obligations for arbitra-
tors."5 Any information disclosed to the SROs is to be communicated to
the parties.86
1. The Uniform Code. The Uniform Code requires that parties re-
ceive the arbitrator's employment history for the preceding ten years.8 '
In addition, the Uniform Code has specifically incorporated the conflict
and disclosure provisions of the American Bar Association/American Ar-
bitration Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Dis-
putes.8 Parties may also make requests for additional information about
an arbitrator. The Uniform Code requires arbitrators to make reason-
able efforts to uncover the types of conflicts anticipated by the rule, and
82. I.
83. Id
84. AAA SECs. ARn. RULES Rule 47(a); see also M. WILNER, supra note 55, at § 26.00.
85. UNIF. CODE § 11 (SICA 1989).
86. Id.
87. Id§9.
88. This document is available from the AAA and the SROs.
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advises the arbitrators that the duty to disclose conflicts is ongoing.89
2. SRO Rules. All SROs' rules follow the Uniform Code. 90
E. Other Rule Changes
The Uniform Code and SRO rules have been changed in other ways
that improve the fairness and efficiency of SRO arbitration. The Uni-
form Code has been changed as follows:
* parties serve most pleadings on each other, instead of rely-
ing on the arbitration department; 91
* SROs are permitted to fill vacancies on an arbitration panel
rather than restarting the proceeding; 92
" the monetary claim limit was increased for cases to be heard
under the simplified procedures developed in the Uniform
Code;9
3
* the maintenance of a verbatim record is now required;94
* the single arbitrator appointed under the simplified proce-
dures in cases involving public customers will be a public
arbitrator;95
* the term " hearing session" is defined; 96 and
• fees that may be assessed against the parties are clarified.97
89. UNIF. CODE § I1(c) (SICA 1989).
90. See Rules 608, 610, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 11 2608, 2610 (May 10, 1989); Code of
Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Section 23, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 3723 (May
10, 1989); Rule 603, 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9542A (May 10, 1989); Rule 24, Section
11, Midwest Stock Ex. Guide (CCII) % 1554 (Sept. 1, 1989); Rule 18.13, Chicago Bd. Options
Ex. Guide (CCH) 1 2523 (Sept. 7, 1989); Section 13, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Manual
(CCH) 3671 (Dec. 1, 1989).
91. See, eg., Rules 601, 612, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 17 2601, 2612 (May 10, 1989);
Rules 606, 621, 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 41 9545, 9551H (May 10, 1989); Code of
Arbitration Procedure: Article III, Sections 13, 25, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) I 3713,
3725 (May 10, 1989).
92. See, eg., Rules 606, 611, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) %% 2606, 2611 (May 10, 1989);
Rule 602, 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 1 9542 (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Proce-
dure: Article III, Section 21, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (CCH) 1 3721 (May 10, 1989).
93. See, eg., Rule 601, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) % 2601 (May 10, 1989); Rule 621, 2 Am.
Stock. Ex. Guide (CCH) % 9551H (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Procedure: Section 13,
Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) % 3713 (May 10, 1989).
94. See, e.g., Rule 623, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2623 (May 10, 1989); Rule 614, 2 Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9551B (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Procedure: Section 37,
Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual (CCII) 1 3737 (May 10, 1989).
95. See, eg., rules cited supra note 93.
96. See, e-g., Rule 629, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2629 (May 10, 1989); Rule 620, 2 Am,
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) % 9551G (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Procedure: Section 43,
Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual 3743 (May 10, 1989).
97. See, e.g., rules cited supra note 93.
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VI. OTHER SICA PROJECTS
The Commission also recommended that the SROs and SICA make
other changes in the administration of SRO arbitration that would not
necessarily result in the adoption of rules, but would have other benefits
such as expanded attention to arbitrator training, arbitrator evaluation,
and special rules for large and complex cases.
A. Arbitrator Training
The Commission recommended that SROs implement effective arbi-
trator education programs to address the broad range of substantive state
law, arbitration law, and securities law issues that are likely to arise in
arbitrations. The Commission recommended that a publicly available
newsletter as well as a manual for arbitrators be developed to accomplish
the needed training.
A first edition of an arbitrators' manual has been distributed to arbi-
trators, and the SROs have agreed to provide periodic additions and
amendments.9" The manual addresses many issues confronting arbitra-
tors, both in the routine administration of cases and special situations
such as disciplinary referrals and the ability to refer cases to the courts."
Further, SROs have expanded their training programs, and SROs' edu-
cational pamphlets for investors have been updated to reflect the revised
procedures brought about by the new rules. While no newsletter has
been produced, SROs have undertaken to mail current literature or case
law developments to arbitrators and advise them of training opportuni-
ties provided by such groups as the AAA.
Educational work is not completed. In testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs in February 1990, the Commission repeated the need for
SROs to provide more advanced training for arbitrators. The Commis-
sion stated that arbitrators should be provided guidance both with re-
spect to the administration of large and complex cases, and with respect
to basic securities market operations." °
98. SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MAN-
UAL (19-), (available upon request through the SRO members of SICA) [hereinafter ARBI-
TRATOR'S MANUAL].
99. See, eg., id, at 1, 6, 25.
100. Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 647 Before the Sub-
Comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33 (1990) [hereinafter Securities Law Enforcement] (statement of Richard
G. Ketchum, Director, Division of Market Regulation, and Joseph I. Goldstein, Associate
Director, Division of Enforcement of the SEC Concerning Issues Related to Small Investors).
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B. Arbitrator Evaluation
The Commission also has encouraged SICA to institute an im-
proved evaluation system for arbitrators. The SICA was asked to de-
velop a questionnaire to be filled out by parties, their counsel, SRO staff,
and other arbitrators seeking evaluations of arbitrator competence,
preparedness, and fairness. The SICA approved sample evaluation forms
at its January 1990 meeting, and SROs have begun to use the forms. In
its February 1990 testimony, the Commission announced that it would
monitor the use of the new forms to determine whether this system per-
mits the SROs to identify more readily their most able arbitrators, arbi-
trators who require further training, and arbitrators who should no
longer serve on panels.
C. Large and Complex Cases
The SICA's continuing agenda also includes the need to develop
procedures appropriate for large and complex cases. In the September
1987 letter and subsequent testimony, the Commission urged that SICA
pursue efforts to develop flexible alternative rules for complex cases, in-
cluding options in arbitrator selection and the use of written opinions. 1 1
The SICA's work on large and complex cases also includes clarifica-
tion of the means for investors to pursue joint claims against brokers,
through joined claims and through class actions. Two significant recent
SICA actions may provide guidance in this regard. First, SICA has
adopted an amendment to its joinder rule to clarify that investor claim-
ants may elect to join common claims against their brokers. The SROs
are in the process of incorporating this change into their rules.1"2 The
SICA also adopted new procedures relating to the handling of class ac-
tion litigation at its October 1989 meeting. SICA concluded that individ-
ual SRO forums may not be able to administer the certification and
representation issues involved in initiating class actions. Accordingly,
SICA announced a policy that it would not accept class actions unless
they had been referred to arbitration by a court. The SICA's policy re-
flects the judgment that courts would be willing to reconcile the policy
interests involved in providing claimants with the ability to pursue jointly
common claims with the federal policy supporting the enforcement of
arbitration contracts. This approach has been followed by some courts
101. Sept. 10 Letter, supra note 9, at 12-13, reprinted in Arbitratio.n Reform, supra note 9,
at 507-08.
102. See, eg., Rule 612, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2601 (May 10, 1989); Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure: Section 25, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 1 3725 (May 10, 1989);
UNIF. CODE § 13(d) (SICA 1989).
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that refer cases to arbitration panels in accordance with parties' arbitra-
tion contracts once the parties resolved the certification and representa-
tion issues. The courts retain jurisdiction over these issues during the
arbitration of the matter.103 Close attention should be paid to develop-
ments under this policy to learn whether it actually provides parties with
a mechanism to pursue class claims."°
Under existing SRO rules, the SROs have the option to decline cases
that are not suited to arbitration in the SROs' forums.105 As noted in
footnote 56 of the May 1989 Order, one means of responding to certain
complex cases may be for the SROs to decline access to their arbitration
forums."°6 In addition, SICA's recently published training manual, The
Arbitrator's Manual, provides some guidance as to when arbitrators
might elect to use their authority1 7 to refer particular cases to the
courts.'00 This section of the manual was developed by SICA in response
to Commission initiatives in the July 12, 1988 testimony before the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. 1°9
103. See, eg., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 132 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Keating v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 183 Cal. Rptr. 260, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982), rey'd on other
grounds sub non., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Lewis v. Prudential Bache
Sec., Inc., 179 Cal. App. 3d 935, 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1986); Stevenson v. Dep't of Revenue, 489
Pa. 1, 413 A.2d 667 (1980). But cf Ore & Chemical Co. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 606 F. Supp.
1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
104. In addition, a SICA drafting committee is working on language for a statement of
policy to be included in its procedures pamphlet that would announce the availability of spe-
cial services at additional cost for large and complex cases.
105. See, eg., Constitution, Article XI, Section 3, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CC-) f 1501 (May
10, 1989); Code of Arbitration Procedure: Section 12, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH)
3712 (May 10, 1989).
106. Id
107. See, eg., Rule 604,2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2604 (May 10, 1985); Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure: Section 16, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers Manual 3716 (May 10, 1989).
108. The manual provides:
Any party may challenge the appropriateness of arbitration. A party may request
that the arbitrators dismiss the arbitration and refer the parties to their remedies at
law. One type of case that may be appropriate for such a dismissal is a case in which
claims are asserted against parties who have not agreed to arbitrate. Since such par-
ties may not agree to participate in arbitration, a referral to legal remedies may avoid
multiple proceedings and ultimately conserve legal resources. Other areas in which
the arbitrators may consider using this authority include class actions, shareholder
derivative suits, cases that involve substantial legal issues for which the establishment
of a legal precedent is important, or cases in which witnesses or documents essential
to a fair and final decision are unavailable.
ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 98, at 6.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 126-129.
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D. Non-SRO Forums
In 1987, the Commission recommended that SICA encourage bro-
ker-dealers to include the AAA as an alternative fonm choice for arbi-
tration with customers (in addition to the SRO forums). t 0 The
Commission stated that access to AAA would relieve pressure on the
growing SRO dockets, and would recognize that some investors do not
approve of arbitration facilities administered by the SROs. In May 1990
Richard Ketchum, Director of the Division of Market Regulation, wrote
to the SROs that administer arbitrations, and requested consideration by
these SROs of the implementation of a uniform rule providing for inves-
tor access to a non-SRO arbitration forum in addition to the SRO fo-
rums."'1 His letter repeats the views that investor access to a non-SRO
forum might enhance customer confidence in the fairness of securities
industry dispute resolution proceedings, and might relieve caseload pres-
sure. SROs are considering this idea.
E. The AAA and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
Constitution
In addition, there has been a growing volume of discussion and liti-
gation concerning the meaning of a provision of the AMEX Constitution
that appears to permit customers of Amex members to resolve disputes
through the AAA.12 The provision grants investors the ability to pur-
sue claims against AMEX members at the AAA "in the City of New
York" unless their arbitration agreements provide solely for arbitration
pursuant to the rules of the Amex." 3 Litigation has focused both on
whether the reference to New York is intended only as identification for
the AAA, whose headquarters is located in New York City, or whether
the reference is intended to limit hearing situs, and whether the provision
supersedes contrary contractual provisions limiting the parties to SRO
forums.11 4 Courts are split on when the provision provides customers
access to AAA.115 The AMEX has submitted a rule filing to the Com-
110. AAA modified its commercial arbitration rules in 1987 in order to accommodate se-
curities arbitration cases. The Commission has no oversight authority over the AAA's rules or
administration of its rules.
11. Letter from Richard G. Ketchum to all SICA members (Apr. 11, 1990).
112. Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2(c), 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 1 9063 (May
10, 1989).
113. Id.
114. New SRO rules adopted by the AMEX and other SROs in 1989 clarify that brokerage
firms may not employ arbitration contracts that conflict with SRO rules. See authorities cited
supra note 8.
115. Compare Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318, 558 N.E.2d 27, 559 N.Y.S.2d
[Vol, 14
Dispute Resolution
mission that proposes to amend the provision by granting customers ac-
cess to the AAA unless they have entered into a contract with their
broker that provides for arbitration at a forum sponsored by any SRO.
VII. USE OF PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES
BY THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN
AGREEMENTS WITH ITS CUSTOMERS
A. SEC Findings Concerning the Use of Predispute Arbitration
Clauses
There has been much discussion in recent years concerning the
widespread use of predispute arbitration clauses by broker-dealers in
their agreements with customers. In late 1987 the staff studied how
widely used predispute arbitration contracts were, what their provisions
were, in what sorts of contracts they were used, and how willing the
firms were to negotiate the clauses with prospective investors. 16 The
study focused on whether the investors had adequate disclosure of the
existence and meaning of the arbitration clauses, and whether access to
the securities markets was conditioned upon the signing of a predispute
arbitration clause. 1 7
The staff examined sixty-five broker-dealers, including twenty-five of
the largest NYSE members, the twenty largest NASD members that are
not also members of the NYSE, and a cross section of other NASD firms.
Ninety-six percent of the margin accounts, ninety-five percent of the op-
tions accounts, and thirty-nine percent of the cash accounts at the firms
that provided such data to the staff included predispute arbitration
225 (1990) (holding that the provision grants investors access to arbitration at the AAA) with
Paine Webber v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990), Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903
F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990), and Piltch v. Merrill Lynch, 714 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding
that the provision did not grant such access when customer agreements limited the available
forums).
116. Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at 436 (summary of SEC staff findings with respect
to the use of predispute arbitration clauses).
117. We note, in this regard, this Court's recent reminder that "courts should remain at-
tuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud
or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any con-
tract.'" Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 83-1669 (July 2. 1985),
slip op. 12 (quoting 9 U.S.C. 2). See also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing situation where customer "had no choice but to accept
the arbitration stipulation, thereby making the stipulation an unconscionable and unenforce-
able provision"). Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at n.l, Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44).
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clauses in the account agreements.11
At the time of the study, some firms that did not already require
predispute arbitration clauses for cash accounts indicated that they were
considering doing so. However, subsequent to the staff's study, during
the Commission's consideration of this issue, industry statements were
made suggesting that several large firms, which have a large proportion
of customer accounts, did not intend to require predispute arbitration
clauses in cash account agreements. The continuation of such investor
access to brokerage services without having to sign a predispute arbitra-
tion clause has been a significant factor in the Commission's evaluation
of this matter. 119
B. Commission Initiatives with the SROs Concerning Arbitration
Clauses
One option considered by the Commission was whether it would be
appropriate to recommend to Congress legislation that would prohibit
broker-dealers from conditioning investor access to brokerage services on
the signing of a predispute arbitration agreement. The Commission de-
termined at an open meeting in July 1988 to defer its decision whether to
recommend legislation in this area pending SRO review of the issues
raised by the use of mandatory predispute arbitration clauses, consistent
with the responsibilities vested in those organizations by the Exchange
Act. Accordingly, Chairman Ruder wrote to the SROs on July 8, 1988,
requesting that they address the issues raised by the use of predispute
arbitration clauses. 120
Soon after that letter, three areas for close SRO review and com-
ment regarding the arbitration clauses were raised in the July 12, 1988
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance. 121 First, SROs were requested to take the initiative with respect
to disclosure of the existence or meaning of predispute arbitration
clauses. Second, they were requested to examine the content of the arbi-
tration clauses to determine whether rules were necessary to preclude
clauses from being used to limit the availability of relief to investors.
Finally, the new idea of creating an "exit" from the arbitration sys-
tem for appropriate cases was introduced. This concept would ensure
118. See Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at 437 (summary of SEC staff findings with
respect to the use of predispute arbitration clauses).
119. May 1989 Order, supra note 8, at 21,153-21,155.
120. July 8 Letter, supra note 16, at 1-2, reprinted in Arbitration Reform, supra note 8, at
509-10.
121. Arbitration Reform, supra note 9, at 486-88 (statement of David S. Ruder).
(Vol. 14
Dispute Resolution
that arbitrators are advised of their existing authority under the Uniform
Code to refer specific cases to the courts for resolution. Using this ap-
proach, SRO rules might identify appropriate types of cases for referral,
such as those involving very difficult and complex litigation, class ac-
tions, and cases involving multiple parties, not all of whom may have
signed predispute arbitration agreements or otherwise would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the SRO-sponsored arbitration forum. Addition-
ally, cases that involve novel legal theories or that challenge established
industry practices may be appropriate for court referral. The testimony
noted that referral in such cases would permit the continuation of judi-
cial precedent to guide arbitrators and others on the application of broad
statutory provisions, such as the antifraud provisions of the federal secur-
ities laws, to new products and practices."n
C. SRO Action Regarding Predispute Arbitration Clauses
The SROs responded to the Commission's request for action mid-
October 1988 with several specific proposals. 2 ' None of the SROs pro-
posed to take action to prohibit a firm from refusing to deal with a cus-
tomer who refuses to sign a mandatory predispute arbitration clause.
Instead, the SROs proposed a package of regulatory actions designed to
improve disclosure to customers in account-opening agreements and to
restrict the content of the arbitration clauses. 24 These proposals have
been approved by the Commission." 5
122. See May 1989 Order, supra note 8, at 21,154 n.56.
123. The SROs' responses are available through the Commission's public reference room in
File No. S7-22-88, or directly from the SROs.
124. In response to the Commission's July 8 Letter, supra note 16, as well as David S.
Ruder's testimony, supra note 17, the NYSE commissioned a study from the accounting firm
of Deloittei Haskins & Sells to compare the results of arbitrated and litigated cases. The
Deloitte study reviewed the results of both litigated and arbitrated cases at six large retail
brokerage firms. The results indicate that customers appear to do as well in arbitrated cases as
they do in litigated cases with respect to their recovery of compensatory damages. Based on
the data reviewed, arbitration also appears to be faster and cheaper for the brokerage firms
than is litigation through the courts.
125. Rule 637, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2637 (May 10, 1989); Rule 427, 2 Am. Stock
Ex. Guide (CC) 9447 (May 10, 1989); Rules of Fair Practice: Section 21, Nat'l As'n Sec.
Dealers (CCH) 2171 (May 10, 1989); Rule 24, Section 33, Midwest Stock Ex. Guide (CCH)
1554 (Sept. 1, 1989); Rule 18, Section 35, Chicago Bd. Options Ex. Guide (CCH) r 2540B
(effective Sept. 7, 1989); Rule G-35, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Manual (CCH) f 3671 (effec.
tive Dec. 1, 1989). The other SRO's comparable rules should be considered by the Commis-
sion in the near future.
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D. Broker-Dealer Obligations with Respect to Predispute Arbitration
Clauses
1. Disclosure of Predispute Arbitration Clauses. The new rules re-
quire broker-dealers that employ predispute arbitration clauses to place
immediately before the clause introductory language that would inform
customers that they are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, that
arbitration is final, that discovery is generally more limited than in court
proceedings, that the arbitration award is not required to contain factual
findings and legal reasoning, and that the arbitration panel typically will
include a minority of arbitrators associated with the securities
industry. 126
The rules also require that the disclosure language be highlighted in
four ways: 1) through the use of large or otherwise distinguishable type;
2) by a requirement that the disclosure language be set out in outline
form so as to be noticeable to readers; 3) through the insertion, immedi-
ately preceding the signature line on the contract, of a statement, also
highlighted, indicating that the agreement contains a predispute arbitra-
tion clause and where that clause can be found; and 4) by requiring that a
copy of the agreement containing a predispute arbitration clause be given
to the customer, who acknowledges receipt of the agreement, either in
the agreement itself or in a separate document. 127
2. Content of Predispute Arbitration Clauses. The rule developed
through SICA prohibits any agreement that limits or contradicts the
rules of any SRO, or limits the ability of a party to file any claim in
arbitration or the ability of the arbitrators to make any award.128 The
purposes of the rule are to prevent broker-dealers from limiting the rights
of investors to seek punitive damages or attorneys fees that might other-
wise be available under applicable law, and to prevent the clauses from
being used for such things as curtailing relevant statutes of limitations or
affecting provisions governing the situs for dispute resolution or the
availability of alternative SRO forums.'2 9
126. See rules cited supra note 125.
127. See id
128. See id.
129. The Commission's approval of the new arbitration clause rule is consistent with the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the Commission has the authority
to assure customer choice among SRO arbitration forums. Roney v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218
(1989).
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VIII. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SECURITIES
ARBITRATION
Congress has expressed continued interest in securities arbitration in
recent years. The 100th Congress held hearings to consider SRO arbitra-
tion. Legislation was introduced that would have codified procedural de-
tails of the arbitration process and prohibited the use of mandatory
predispute arbitration clauses.13 0 The legislation as introduced would
have given the Commission less flexibility in revising arbitration rules.
The legislation's approach to questions of arbitration awards, arbitrator
qualifications, and discovery vary somewhat from the Commission's rec-
ommendations in its September 1987 letter. The legislation was not ac-
ted on before Congress adjourned.
In addition, in the 101st Congress, the Subcommittee on Securities
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held
hearings to consider the SRO arbitration system on February 8, 1990.
There is no legislation pending related to those hearings. On January 31,
1990, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested the
Comptroller General of the United States to have the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) prepare a comprehensive study of securities industry
practices with respect to predispute arbitration clauses in customer
agreements and of the arbitration process as sponsored by the SROs. 13 t
Further, on March 28, 1990, Senators Wirth, Bryan, Riegle, Dixon, and
Sanford wrote to Congressman Boucher with a list of twelve questions
that they would like considered in the context of the GAO's study.' 32
IX. A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED SRO ARBITRATION
FORUM
There has been periodic discussion within SICA over the years of
developing a single SRO arbitration forum for the resolution of securities
cases that would replace the current SRO arbitration forums.1 33 That
discussion has become more focused. At its January and April 1990
meetings, SICA resolved to endorse a study of the factors involved in the
130. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. E2245-02 (daily ed. June 30,
1988).
131. Following the announcement of the GAO study, the Securities Industry Association,
the trade group of the securities industry, began to solicit industry interest in sponsoring its
own study of securities arbitration to be carried out by The Rand Corporation. It is unclear
whether such a study will be undertaken.
132. Letter from Senators Wirth, Bryan, Riegle, Dixon, and Sanford to Congressman
Boucher (Mar. 28, 1990).
133. See, eg., Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URn. L.J.
361, 384 (1988).
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establishment of a single forum, including cost, funding, legal status, gov-
ernance, SEC oversight, and other relevant factors. SICA decided to so-
licit bids for such a study. In December 1989 the Securities Industry
Association issued statements in support of the consideration of such a
proposal. In its February 1990 testimony, the Commission stated that it
"looks forward to receiving further information on the costs and benefits
of this proposal as well as any other alternatives that are developed to
improve the delivery of quality arbitration services at reasonable cost."' 134
X. THE EFFECTS OF THE EMERGING GLOBALIZED
FINANCIAL SYSTEM ON SECURITIES
ARBITRATION
As the links between the world's securities markets strengthen, it is
likely that arbitration facilities are going to be called upon to address
disputes that occur in cross-market trading, or disputes involving foreign
nationals abroad. Since SRO arbitration is available upon demand to all
customers of SRO member broker-dealers, even in the absence of specific
contractual provisions, it is likely that SRO arbitration facilities are go-
ing to administer some of these disputes.
U.S. statutory and case law, moreover, has been favorable to the
resolution of international commercial disputes by arbitration. In 1970,
the United States ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 35 The U.N. Con-
vention, incorporated into chapter two of the U.S. Arbitration Act,
facilitates the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and of foreign arbi-
tration awards. In addition, the growing endorsement of arbitration by
U.S. courts, as discussed in connection with the McMahon and Rodri-
guez cases above, developed early in the international commercial con-
text. For example, two cases in the early 1970s, MIS Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co. 136 and Scherk v. Alberto Culver,137 treated contracts to ar-
bitrate international commercial disputes no differently than other con-
tracts, enforcing forum selection provisions that provided for both the
site of a tribunal and the procedures to govern the proceedings in arbitra-
tion. These cases moved away from the notion that only U.S. law and
U.S. courts could resolve disputes involving U.S. parties.
As cross-border disputes arise, the adequacy of the new arbitration
134. Securities Law Enforcement, supra note 100, at 38 (statement of Richard G. Ketchum
and Joseph I. Goldstein).
135. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970).
136. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
137. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
[Vol. 14
Dispute Resolution
procedures developed by the SROs will be tested by the demands of dif-
ferent markets, different cultural expectations, and the need for different
expertise by arbitrators. Under current SRO procedures, there exists
flexibility for parties, arbitrators, and administrative staff to fashion
methods for producing evidence, taking testimony, and holding hearings
in accommodation of parties' needs. As these cases arise, creative appli-
cation of existing rules, and identification of areas where the procedures
may need modification to accommodate cross-border disputes should be
pursued.
To the extent that parties identify in their contracts the law to be
applied to their disputes, both U.S. law and the law of other nations en-
dorse the view that a choice of law provision generally should be given
effect.138 Accordingly, parties to some extent may anticipate different
approaches to disputes or applicable substantive law, and provide cer-
tainty with respect to the law to be applied to their disputes in arbitra-
tion. Moreover, while arbitrators are less restricted than the courts in
their application of the law, arbitrators should give effect to choice of law
provisions in the parties' contract. 139 An SRO member's ability to estab-
lish, by contract, procedures for international arbitration is limited by its
obligations to submit to arbitration pursuant to SRO arbitration rules. 140
138. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2) which pro-
vides that, in the United States, the law of the state chosen by the parties generally will be
applied unless
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the
law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which [under other principles] would be the state of the applica-
ble law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
In Japan, Article 7 of the Act Concerning Applications of Laws ("Horei"), provides that the
intent of the parties governs which country's law governs the creation and effect of a legal act.
See 3 DOING BusiNEss IN JAPAN § 1.03[6] (K Zitagawa ed. 1987) (1989).
139. See M. WILNER, supra note 55, at § 25:04; Branson & Wallace, Choosing the Substan-
tive Law to Apply in International Commercial Arbitration, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 46 (1986).
140. See, e.g., Rule 613, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2613 (May 10, 1989), which provides
that the site of the initial hearing will be determined by the NYSE Director of Arbitration, and
that subsequent hearings will be determined by the arbitrators; Rule 637, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2637 (May 10, 1989), which prohibits NYSE members from employing arbitration
contracts that limit or contradict the rules of any self-regulatory organization or limit the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of the arbitrators to make
any award, and Constitution, Article XI, Section 1, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1r 1501 (May 10,
1989), which requires NYSE members to submit to arbitration with customers pursuant to
NYSE rules.
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